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particular.1. INTRODUCTION
The Rural Territorial Dynamics program that generated
the articles includes in this special issue of World Develop-
ment was guided by three questions. (1) Are there rural ter-
ritories in Latin America that have experienced simultaneous
economic growth, poverty reduction, and improved distribu-
tion of income?; (2) What factors determine such kinds of
territorial dynamics?, and; (3) What can be done through
public policy but also from other spaces of public action,
in order to stimulate and promote this kind of territorial
dynamics?
The introductory article in this collection, by Berdegue´,
Bebbington, and Escobal proposed that the answers to those
questions needed to be framed by a mid-range or operational
theory that explained institutional diversity across space or, in
our program, across territories. The interplay between agents,
institutions, and social structures at the territorial level, was
proposed as the lens through which we would seek the answers
to our research questions. Spatially diﬀerentiated patterns of
institutional reproduction and change were conceptualized as
being the result of individual and above all collective human
agency and the geographically uneven ways in which territo-
ries are strategically coupled with extraterritorial economic,
social, and political networks and coalitions. These couplings
aﬀect both institutional forms and territorial dynamics. The
framework allowed for both extraterritorial and territory-
speciﬁc drivers of institutional change. While acknowledging
the signiﬁcant role played by shocks exogenous to territories,
we argued that this type of institutional change could not
account for the spatial variations observed in development
dynamics across diﬀerent territories. Endogenous change,
typically more gradual and cumulative and in which localized
agents and institutions play a much larger role, seemed a
necessary explanatory factor.
In this article we look across the previous ten papers
included in this special issue, plus other evidence published
elsewhere by the program partners, to answer the second
and third research questions: Why this territorial diversity?
What can be done about it?129In Section 2 we discuss ﬁve “bundles of factors” that we
found present in one form or another in our 19 case studies
of territories that experienced dynamics of economic growth
with greater or lesser degrees of social inclusion. We examine
the role of a particular form of human agency that we have
called social-territorial coalitions, and explain why we propose
that the presence of such coalitions is necessary for territorial
dynamics that combine economic growth, social inclusion, and
in some cases environmental sustainability. We conclude
by outlining research and policy agendas to stimulate and sup-
port this type of territorial dynamics.2. RESULTS
The results of Small Area Estimates analysis (Modrego &
Berdegue´, 2015) showed that between the mid-1990s and
mid-2000s, 52% of Latin America’s territories failed to
improve in at least two of the three dimensions of development
that we looked at: growth, poverty, income distribution. A
further 29% had failed in all three dimensions. This latter
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inequality traps. 2 But if we focus on the glass half-full, the
same analysis shows that 12.5% of territories improved in all
three dimensions, and an additional 23.7% experienced eco-
nomic growth with poverty reduction.
The 19 case studies in the second phase of the RTD program
focused on these territories that had managed to avoid the fate
of the majority. Although the processes of change observed in
these 20 territories are far from being homogeneous, we did
ﬁnd several stylized patterns that oﬀer a plausible explanation
of the observed facts. 3 Supplementary Table 1 summarizes the
speciﬁc results in each of the case studies of the RTD program,
using the same categories that are explained below in general
terms.
(a) Structures of resource access and control
The case studies give abundant evidence that natural
resource endowment is an important determinant of territorial
dynamics. The salmon industry transformed Chiloe´, Chile,
because it gained access to coastal waters with excellent condi-
tions, and, when the resource deteriorated, the development
process was seriously disrupted (Ospina, Bebbington,
Hollenstein, Nussbaum, & Ramı´rez, 2015; Ramı´rez & Ruben
Ruerd, 2015). Access to land was a critical factor driving the
expansion of the dairy industry in Santo Toma´s, Nicaragua
(Ravnborg & Go´mez, 2012). The structures governing control
of oil and gas changed the nature of development processes in
Tarija, Bolivia (Hinojosa, Chumacero, Cortez, & Bebbington
et al., 2012). Others of the 19 case studies not reported in detail
in this issue also highlight the role of resource endowment and
patterns of access and control to these resources in shaping the
nature of territorial dynamics, whether in tourism in Brazil, in
market-oriented smallholder agriculture in Peru and Guate-
mala, or in diversiﬁed rural economies in Mexico.
However, we do not ﬁnd a unidirectional causal relationship
between “more and better” natural resources and higher and
more socially inclusive economic growth. For example, Tungu-
rahua, Ecuador (Ospina & Hollenstein, 2015), is perhaps the
most “successful” of the 20 territories that we studied in depth
when assessed from the perspective of socially inclusive (and rel-
atively environmentally sustainable) economic growth, and yet
this province in the Andes is not particularly well endowed in
natural resources, compared with other places in the same and
other countries, that did not do as well. In contrast, the territory
of Santo Toma´s has more abundant and perhaps better quality
land and climate for the type of agriculture that it practices, and
yet one observes a development dynamic of economic growth
that is not socially inclusive (Ravnborg & Go´mez, 2012). In
Northeast Brazil, two relatively nearby territories with similar
natural resource bases have gone in very diﬀerent directions
when seen from the perspective of socially inclusive growth
(Favareto, Abramovay, D’Oliveira, & Diniz, 2012; Quan,
Olade & Rocha Souza, 2011). 4
The institutional arrangements that govern access to, and
use of natural resources, are an important part of the explana-
tion of the relationship between territorial economic growth,
poverty, and inequality reduction, and environmental sustain-
ability, not only because of the way in which they inﬂuence the
physical asset endowment of diﬀerent groups in territorial
societies, but also because they facilitate or constrain the grad-
ual emergence of human and social assets: skills, networks
within the territory and the outside world. Agrarian institu-
tions were also central in shaping gender systems, and such
inﬂuence is felt strongly today (Deere & Leon, 2001;
Ramı´rez & Ruben, 2015).In the large majority of Latin American rural territories and
at least until late in the second half of the past century, land
was the basis of economic, social, and political power, and
territorial societies organized themselves around the control
and use of this critical resource. A history of highly unequal
land distribution appears in many of the case studies as an
explanatory factor for contemporary territorial dynamics that
tend to be exclusionary and sometimes polarizing. In many of
the territories studied, latifundia beneﬁted from strong state
support and protection, resulting in lack of or very timid
economic transformation, little innovation, and long-term
economic stagnation with very low levels of productivity and
weak linkages with dynamic and competitive markets (c.f. de
Janvry, 1981; Barsky, 1984; Mayer, 2012). The smallholders
and landless laborers living in the interstices of these large
properties never had the opportunity to educate themselves,
nor were they able to acquire the skills and capabilities that
can only emerge from the interaction with other groups in
society and that are needed in order to become signiﬁcant
economic and political actors in later years (Fligstein, 2001).
In slightly more than half of the territories we studied (e.g.,
Carirı´ in Brazil, Santo Tomas in Nicaragua, Susa and Simijaca
in Colombia), we observed this self-reinforcing relationship
between unequal land access, unequal power and asymmetric
institutions, all leading to anemic growth and to widespread
social exclusion. As found by Arias et al. (2012) in their study
of Susa and Simijaca in Colombia, a dualistic agrarian struc-
ture was consolidated in this territory already through the
encomienda system in the XVI century, and 500 years later it
continued to inﬂuence the access of peasants and of small-
scale rural entrepreneurs to the opportunities and beneﬁts of
the “dairy boom” that has characterized this territory in recent
years. Acemoglu and Robinson (2012), although looking at far
larger spatial scales, draw the same conclusion: “extractive
institutions” are responsible for determining why some
countries are poor, and such institutions are the result of
power relations in society.
In a few of the territories studied we found a history of
relatively equal access to land. 5 In some cases, these social
structures emerged over many decades, giving origin to classes
of small and medium artisans, industrialists and traders. This
was particularly the case when more inclusive agrarian
structures were coupled with access to dynamic markets
(as in Jauja, Peru, linked to the capital city of Lima, and
Tungurahua that, through its main town, Ambato, was
embedded in the main trade routes of Ecuador). The beneﬁts
of more inclusive land access were less pronounced in places
like Cuatro Lagunas, Peru, or Chiloe´, Chile, where
smallholders and producers remained relatively isolated from
regional and national markets until recent years.
Both types of territories show that agrarian institutions tend
to reproduce themselves over time, with consequences, posi-
tive or negative, for present-day territorial development
dynamics. Yet, other case studies give clues about the condi-
tions under which such path-dependent processes can be
altered. In some cases, agrarian reforms changed access to
natural resources in what appears to be an irreversible way
(e.g., Valle Sur-Ocongate en Peru´; Asensio & Trivelli, 2012),
creating the opportunity for territorial dynamics that are more
inclusive economically and politically. Similar policies, how-
ever, in other territories such as Santo Toma´s, Nicaragua
(Ravnborg & Go´mez, 2012) were frustrated by the power of
entrenched actors who managed to defeat the new agrarian
institutions and re-concentrate land.
In yet another group of territories, while land was relatively
evenly distributed due to historic reasons (e.g., Chiloe´, Chile,
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become based on diﬀerent natural resources (coastal waters
in Chiloe´, or gas in Tarija) control over which has been dom-
inated from the outset by a handful of extra-territorial agents.
In another variation, agrarian reforms were successful in
establishing and stabilizing relatively equal access to land
(e.g., Yucata´n, Mexico), but new policies (such as the disman-
tling of state protection and of small farm support policies
during structural adjustment and liberalizations processes)
led to the displacement of the old dynamics and the emergence
of altogether new economic activities that are largely decou-
pled from access to natural resources (for instance, manufac-
turing in the case of the territory studied in Yucata´n). These
three are examples of a rural territorial dynamic also found
in other parts of Latin America in which agricultural land
has lost its centrality, eroding the inﬂuence of agrarian institu-
tions and of formerly powerful social actors. In many rural
territories of Latin America, new economic activities, new
resources, and therefore new sets of institutions and of social
actors, are taking center stage, and this leads to changes in
the territorial dynamics, sometimes, but certainly not always,
in the direction of faster, more inclusive and more sustainable
economic growth. Hollenstein and Ospina’s paper in this
volume addresses this issue.
(b) Economic structures and linkages with dynamic markets
The 20 territories that we studied have managed to boost
their economies and grow using either of the following strate-
gies: connection to dynamic markets or access to public or pri-
vate transfers from outside the territory. However, the
evidence shows that it is unlikely that growth based on public
transfers will be sustained, unless such resources are capital-
ized within the territory and can generate some domestic
engine of growth.
While the papers reveal the central role of dynamic markets
in stimulating sustained growth in a territory, the studies also
show that such linkages do not necessarily generate social
inclusion or, even less, environmental sustainability. This
potential combination of growth with inclusion depends,
instead, on the ways in which “soft” factors (those highlighted
by economic sociology) and “hard” factors (those emphasized
by the new economic geography) interact. As shown in
Escobal, Favareto, Aguirre and Ponce (2015), “hard” factors
(e.g., the advantages of location, privileged access to public
goods and services, and proximity to a city) alone do not
explain the reduction in inequality that has occurred in Tungu-
rahua, Ecuador. Nor do they explain why the bulk of the ben-
eﬁts to the inhabitants of a territory will be generated in some
cases via the agricultural labor market (O´Higgins), but in
others (e.g., Tungurahua and Valle Sur-Ocongate) via pro-
cesses of diversiﬁcation into non-agricultural sectors led by
small-scale local producers. To understand these dynamics it
is necessary to combine the role of “hard” factors with that
of “soft” factors through which local actors succeed in modi-
fying market relations. In the case of Tungurahua, for exam-
ple, these combinations of hard and soft factors emphasize
the centrality of inter-family relations, associated with trust
and reciprocity, as key elements for the consolidation of a
diversiﬁed and highly decentralized economic structure. In
the case of O´Higgins, hard and soft factors combined explain
the rules of market exchange as the region’s economic take-oﬀ
happens after an important increase in public investment in
transport and irrigation infrastructure that brought to the ter-
ritory medium and large producers and triggered changes in
the local labor market and in key input markets such as thatregulating access to water. Finally, in the case of Valle Sur-
Ocongate, the combination of hard and soft factors allows
us to understand how enhancing the market value of cultural
assets has allowed the territory to compete through the diﬀer-
entiation of products and services. Gender systems also
emerge as important determinants of labor market dynamics
and, hence, of territorial economic development in Chiloe´,
Chile (Ramı´rez & Ruben, 2015), and in the Ostu´a-Guija
watershed, Guatemala where small and medium farmers led
a process of labor-intensive agricultural development
(Romero, Pela´ez, & Frausto, 2011).
The cases of Tungurahua in Ecuador or Santa Catarina in
Brazil (Cerdan, Policarpo, & Vieira, 2012) suggest that when
dynamic markets are linked with more diversiﬁed economic
structures, there will be options for a wider range of linkages
in the territories, which in turn opens up more opportunities
to participate and beneﬁt from the dynamics of growth. This
wider range of linkages allows for the strengthening of the social
capital of the actors in the territory and increases the chances
that more inclusive growth coalitions might emerge. Both in
the case of Valle Sur-Ocongate and Tungurahua, forms of gov-
ernance have been built on fairly decentralized agricultural
structures where there are a large number of small and medium
producers that dominate the rural landscape, promoting local
and regional trade.On the other hand, diversiﬁcation of the pro-
ductive structure is much greater in Tungurahua than in Valle
Sur-Ocongate.Under those conditions, the forms of governance
of the relationship with markets (rules of exchange and concep-
tions of control) are more favorable to the participation of the
poor, based on trust relations and a more democratic access to
information (Escobal et al., 2015).
Secondly when links to dynamic markets are reinforced with
more equitable structures of access to land and resources, eco-
nomic growth opportunities are much higher; the contrast
between Santo Tomas, in Nicaragua and Tungurahua, in
Ecuador, highlights this ﬁnding. While in Santo Toma´s the
concentration of land has led to power structures that directed
public investment in favor of the rich and facilitated the cap-
ture of the beneﬁts coming from the linkages to dynamic mar-
kets (Ravnborg & Go´mez, 2012), in Tungurahua the relatively
more equitable distribution of land and access to irrigation
water facilitated the consolidation of a segment of small pro-
ducers and facilitated the installation of a dense system of
local markets that underlies the inclusive growth dynamic that
has characterized this territory (Ospina & Hollenstein, 2015).
The examples of Valle Sur-Ocongate and Tungurahua also
show the importance of territories’ connections to a regional
market (Cusco in the case of Valle Sur, and Ambato in the case
of Tungurahua). The dynamics of both territories are marked
by the dynamism of these medium-sized cities. In both cases
actors within the territories were able to build alliances or diﬀer-
entiate their products in ways that helped them face the compe-
tition from other suppliers of similar services and products. In
the case of Valle Sur-Ocongate this was done by identifying
products and services as having speciﬁc cultural content and
being part of a “gastronomic route” for tourists. In Tungurahua
a historical symbiosis between merchants and producers
allowed for the emergence of a network of local markets cen-
tered in the city of Ambato that have allowed greater economic
diversiﬁcation throughout the region.
Many of the cases analyzed also show the eﬀects that diﬀer-
ent types of public policies and investments can have on mar-
kets and production structures at the territorial scale. In
O´Higgins, Chiloe´, Jiquiric¸a´, Valle Sur-Ocongate, and Cerro´n
Grande in El Salvador (Go´mez & Cartagena, 2011) among
others, infrastructure investment has opened the territory to
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growth. The role that the State has fulﬁlled in guaranteeing
property rights has also been evident. In other cases, however,
public policies have had little or no eﬀect if there are no local
and/or extraterritorial institutions that enforce them. This is
perhaps especially so for the case of policies protecting the
local environment. The absence of enforcement explains the
over-exploitation of aquifers in O´Higgins (Escobal et al.,
2015) and the incursion into protected area land in Pen˜as
Blancas, Nicaragua (Go´mez & Cartagena, 2011). The evidence
also shows that the scale and orientation of public investment
can have signiﬁcant impacts on the relative inclusiveness of
growth. Investments in irrigation in O’Higgins and in roads
in Santo Toma´s, have greatly favored larger farms and ﬁrms,
while in Tungurahua the combination of a dynamic city and
an internal road network that supports a network of rural
markets has made it easier for small and medium entrepre-
neurs to beneﬁt from a range of public investments.
Finally, translocal economic networks have considerable
inﬂuence over how the opportunities and beneﬁts of growth
are distributed. Some markets, by the nature of the product
(e.g., organic coﬀee in Loja) attract a kind of extra-territorial
actor that is more likely to foster pro-poor forms of market
governance. Conversely markets based on the extraction of a
natural resource (for example gas in Tarija) typically involve
extra-territorial actors that impose limits to the relative inclu-
siveness of market governance. But even in these cases -as
shown in the case of Tarija- there is room for maneuver,
depending on the economic and social structures that are pre-
sent in the territory. The existence of a long-standing agrarian
bourgeoisie in Tarija has helped in developing a territorial
coalition with greater capacity and power to confront extra-
territorial actors and exercise greater control over the destinies
of the income coming from the exploitation of the gas reserves
(Hinojosa et al., 2012).
(c) Intermediate cities and rural–urban linkages
Latin American rural societies no longer are constituted
mainly by dispersed and relatively isolated villages, with little
access to services, with a culture that is markedly diﬀerent and
even antagonistic to that of urban people, living oﬀ agriculture
and other primary activities. In countries as diverse as Chile,
Mexico, and Colombia, only 6%, 7%, and 17% of the popula-
tion live in these “deep” rural areas. On the other hand, there
is the myth that Latin Americans today are concentrated in
large cities and huge metropolises like Sao Paulo or Mexico
City; in fact, the 79 cities in the region with more than 750
thousand inhabitants, house 38% of the total population,
declining to 34% by 2025 (United Nations, 2012). The space
in between includes the larger share of contemporary rural
societies in this region. It is a heterogeneous space, including
territories that are largely rural but contain a small city of a
few thousand inhabitants, to others in which a city with up
to tens of thousands inhabitants dominates but is functionally
intertwined with the surrounding rural hinterland (Berdegue´,
Bebbington, & Escobal, 2015; da Veiga, 2002; De Ferranti,
Perry, Foster, Lederman, & Valde´, 2005).
All of the 20 territories studied in the 11 countries maintain
signiﬁcant relations with one or more urban centers; nine of
the 20 contain a small to medium city, with population ranging
from 10,000 to 200,000. These are “rural cities” (Berdegue´,
Jara, Modrego, Sanclemente, & Schejtman, 2010) in the sense
that they have some characteristics typical of an urban place
(e.g., higher population density and greater access to more
specialized services), as well as others which separate themfrom larger urban agglomerations (e.g., a high percentage of
their economically active population employed in agriculture).
The urban core and the rural hinterland constitute a func-
tional territory, in which each part is dependent on the other
(although not equally dependent and certainly not on equal
terms). The bonds that link both parts are diverse: the rural
areas may be the sources of raw materials for the manufactur-
ing sector in the central town (as in Santo Toma´s, Nicaragua,
or in Tungurahua, Ecuador); urban commerce may depend on
rural consumers (as in O’Higgins, Chile); or a large number or
urban dwellers work as wage workers in agriculture (as in
Ostu´a Guija, in Guatemala); or if rural students commute
daily to attend high school, as in Jauja, Peru.
The territories that contain such cities, are rural–urban, and
this condition gives them a set of advantages that facilitate
economic growth and one that is socially more inclusive, or,
at the very least, more conducive to faster and greater poverty
reduction. Such conditions can be grouped in four classes.
Each of these conditions is described in several of the case
studies, and they include: better market access for rural pro-
ducers (particularly for smaller and poorer ones that cannot
aﬀord to travel long distances to reach larger markets); access
of local urban and rural ﬁrms to specialized services (e.g.,
ﬁnancial services, IT); a larger demand for non-farm jobs
(and a greater diversity of this kind of employment); greater
access of women to the labor market. Also, cities (but only
those above a certain size) attract organizations and individu-
als that improve the capacity of the territory for economic
innovation, and they connect the territory to wider networks
that are important in this respect. All of these economic func-
tions have the potential to lead to two types of eﬀects that are
conducive for socially inclusive economic growth: (a) the
retention within the territory of a larger share of the value
added of the local economy, and (b) the emergence of eco-
nomic structures that are more diversiﬁed both sectorally
and in terms of types and sizes of ﬁrms). 6
There are other mechanisms that are social or demographic.
Such cities in otherwise rural territories are places of concen-
tration of signiﬁcant numbers of rural poor. 7 This concentra-
tion increases the political recognition and facilitates the
organization and representation of the rural poor. Our results
demonstrate that in these rurban territories there is a far smal-
ler gap in access to basic services (education, health, and hous-
ing) between the poor and the non-poor, compared with deep
rural territories. The case studies also suggest that migration
of young people slows down in rurban territories that have
an urban core of a certain size. 8 Finally, in some of the coun-
tries included in our study that had lived through violent con-
ﬂict, these small and medium towns provide (relative) refuge
for people from neighboring rural villages, as was documented
for example in Santo Toma´s, in Nicaragua.
Political and cultural conditions also change in rurban terri-
tories. The greater presence of non-agrarian actors allows for
the emergence of new elites and diﬀerent arrangements
between social groups (as in the Bolivian Chaco, or in Santa
Catarina, Brazil). The origin of these new elites and social
groups sometimes is external to the territory. But in other
cases these groups have evolved from an initial agrarian base,
diﬀerentiating themselves as they become involved in new
types of economic activities. These elites and actors are
equipped with new development discourses and agendas. For
example, in territories as diverse as Tarija, Bolivia, Chiloe´,
Chile, Santa Catarina and Jiquiric¸a´, Brazil, Tungurahua and
Loja, Ecuador, or Jauja, Peru, environmental awareness and
mobilization has been promoted by NGOs, civil society orga-
nizations and local oﬃces of government agencies, that prob-
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urban center. These elites and social groups are also gatekeep-
ers to networks that extend beyond the territory and that are
markedly diﬀerent from those in which agrarian actors are
most prominent. And ﬁnally and paradoxically, the new elites
also permeate agrarian actors and processes; several of the
case studies show that new agricultural and agroprocessing
enterprises involve investors and staﬀ, whose objectives and
visions about the territory are markedly diﬀerent from those
of the traditional landowners, large and small. Finally, these
cities in rurban territories also enhance contact with political
actors (members of congress, political party leaders, and so
on) and processes. Such visibility enhances the participation
of these territories in public programs and, in addition, gives
greater voice to local actors in inﬂuencing local adaptations
of existing programs, to a greater extent than deep rural terri-
tories that are usually left in a “take it or leave it” position
when it comes to negotiating with government agencies. In
summary, these new social actors and elites play roles that
can be decisive in changing the course of territorial develop-
ment: (a) they increase the power of the territory in its dealings
with external agents and processes; (b) link the territory to
wider economic, social, political, and cultural processes; (c)
capture and represent new ideas and development “models”;
(d) capture and reinvest locally a greater share of value added;
(e) enhance the human capital of the territory.
In each territory, these mechanisms (and others) work simul-
taneously. Some improve and others constrain economic
growth, or social inclusion, or environmental sustainability.
These mechanisms interact so the gains derived from one can
be expanded or negated by others, and, of course, in each ter-
ritory, and in diﬀerent stages in the development of a territory,
some mechanisms will be more meaningful and stronger than
others. As a result, it is not a simple matter to predict what will
be the net eﬀect of these dynamics, although the analysis pre-
sented by Berdegue´ et al. (2015) does conclude that, overall,
having an urban center in an otherwise rural territory, will
result in higher economic growth and in a net reduction of pov-
erty, sometimes with an increase in income inequality, in com-
parison with the trends of deep rural territories.
(d) Public investment
In many of the 19 case studies, public investment played a
signiﬁcant role in shaping the territorial dynamic. The studies
of O’Higgins in Chile (Ospina et al., 2015) and of Santo
Tomas in Nicaragua (Ravnborg & Go´mez, 2012) are illustra-
tive of ways in which public investment in public or private
goods, can catalyze signiﬁcant changes in territorial dynamics,
although not necessarily in a more pro-poor direction. The
rain fed sectors of O’Higgins region constituted a territory that
was until recently renowned for its economic stagnation and
its widespread poverty. Public investments in rural roads, pub-
lic services, and changes in the regulations governing access to
groundwater, led to large private investments that deeply
changed the economic, social, and ecological landscape, accel-
erating poverty reduction in large part through the massive
incorporation of rural women to jobs in the agribusiness sec-
tor. In Santo Toma´s, government and international coopera-
tion investments in rural roads, equipment for cold storage
and processing of milk, and formation and strengthening of
cooperatives, also changed the economic landscape, that in
this case came together with increased concentration of prop-
erty in land and the expulsion of poor peasants (the perverse
statistical artifact of which was a “reduction” in the rate of
poverty in the territory). In both O’Higgins and Santo Toma´s,there are quite signiﬁcant processes of environmental degrada-
tion associated with these changes.
The important observation is that – in a way that is similar to
the role of natural resource endowment- it is not so much the
magnitude of the investment that matters in determining the
resulting territorial dynamic as the way in which local actors
and institutional arrangements relate to the investment deci-
sions made outside the territory, as well as to their implementa-
tion. The eﬀects of these investments are mediated by formal
and informal institutions at the territorial level, and by the role
of diﬀerent actors and coalitions, in attracting, regulating, and
controlling the type, localization, and ﬂow of these investments.
In another of the case studies, not included in this issue,
Go´mez & Cartagena (2012) analyze the inﬂuence of large infra-
structure investments in the northern bank of the Cerro´n
Grande wetland in El Salvador. Since the mid-1970s, the social
construction of the territory as a provider of environmental
service to the rest of the country has been the result of the inter-
action between external investment decisions (ﬁrst, a large
hydroelectric dam and, later, a major highway, both works
of national signiﬁcance) and the attempts of local actors and
coalitions to resist, inﬂuence and take advantage of, the ﬂow
of resources. What is clear is that while these investments have
changed the ecological and the economic landscape of the ter-
ritory, they have not resulted in any kind of virtuous cycle of
localized economic growth with social inclusion and environ-
mental sustainability. Gomez and Cartagena conclude that
the territory has lacked a social coalition with the composition,
assets and power to prevail with its own development vision
and agenda over that which is brought into being by external
decisions about these large infrastructural investments.
Finally, the case study of the Valle Sur-Ocongate territory in
the Southern Andes of Peru also sheds light on this topic. Here
public investment is ﬁnanced by the fees and royalties that
mining companies must pay to the state, a fraction of which
is turned over to district governments. The availability of this
new and more ﬂexible source of public funding in the second
half of the 1990s coincided with a social and political process
that saw a profound change in the proﬁle of elected local
authorities, in favor of local leaders who emerged from rural
indigenous communities, had educational and work experi-
ence in nearby Cusco, 9 and were armed with a development
discourse that combined a developmentalist tradition derived
from the NGOs in which many of them had worked and a
strong vindication of indigenous culture. Such “modernizing
indigenism” (indigenismo modernizante: Asensio & Trivelli,
2012), was the basis of new territorial coalitions that have been
deeply inﬂuential in shaping the course of territorial develop-
ment toward greater social inclusion.
(e) Actors, coalitions, agency
We have insisted that the social structures and institutional
arrangements that underlie territorial dynamics tend to be sta-
ble over time, and that such stability is actively produced by
those social actors who beneﬁt from the status quo. The devel-
opment trajectory of a territory only changes when interested
social actors exert pressure in support of institutional change.
In the preceding sections we have given evidence that the types
of social actors, as well as the capacities and capabilities that
they have, are inﬂuenced by such factors as agrarian structures
and institutions of natural resource governance, markets, eco-
nomic structures, cities, and public investments. Changes,
interactions, even slight displacements in any of these factors
create opportunities for institutional change. The realization
of that opportunity depends on the existence of social actors
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territorial development in a diﬀerent direction.
Human agency takes many diﬀerent forms in these territo-
ries, from social movements as in the case of Tarija, Bolivia,
with Guarani indigenous communities and their allies facing
a major multinational corporation and the Bolivian state; to
epistemic communities of dedicated and committed bureau-
crats insisting on the lawful enforcement of environmental reg-
ulations in Estelı´, Nicaragua; to tacit territorial coalitions
combining private investors and government functionaries in
O’Higgins, Chile; to coordinated and politically oriented
social coalitions elaborating an explicitly developmentalist
platform with a long-term vision and capturing local govern-
ment in Tungurahua, Ecuador. Of these diverse forms of col-
lective action, the “Tungurahua model” probably 10 contains
the greatest potential to lead development in the direction of
socially inclusive and environmentally sustainable growth,
for reasons that we discuss below.
Building on results from the 20 territories studied in this
program, Ferna´ndez, Asensio, Trivelli, and Schetjman (2014)
addressed the existence, form, and function of territorial social
coalitions in six of these. They deﬁne a territorial social coali-
tion as “a group of diﬀerent actors that carry out convergent
actions around a territorial development dynamic.” These ter-
ritorial coalitions can be described according to ﬁve character-
istics: their composition; the objectives that their members
share or around which they converge; their medium- and
long-term visions of development; the types of assets, capitals,
and capabilities under their control and that confer them
power; and their domain of action (a territory).
On the basis of these characteristics, Ferna´ndez et al. (2014)
build an “ideal” type of a “transformational territorial social
coalition”, as an analytic lens that they use to look at the evi-
dence from the case studies. Such an ideal transformative social
coalition, they argue, is socially inclusive and represents a vari-
ety of actors, who tacitly or explicitly share or converge over
some important development objectives even though their
motivations can be quite divergent and they may be in conﬂict
or disagreement over many other issues. The actors in the coa-
lition engage in collective action with a long-term perspective
and enjoy suﬃcient power to at least contest the dynamic of
development. This power is based on a combination of diﬀerent
capitals (economic, political, social, cultural) provided by the
diﬀerent members, so that none is in a fully subordinated posi-
tion with respect to others in the coalition. Finally the ideal
coalition is capable of socializing and legitimizing its view
and strategy of development such that these are gradually
accepted and even internalized by other sectors in the territory.
Assessed against this analytic lens, not all the social coalitions
that Ferna´ndez et al. (2014) studied passed the test. The case
studies showed that coalitions were strongly inﬂuenced by
how they negotiate the dilemmas between economic growth
and social inclusion. Some coalitions are focused on promoting
economic growth (growth coalitions: c.f. Rudel, 2009), and this
is related to their having a narrow social base, to the capitals
that they control and mobilize and to the institutions and insti-
tutional changes they prioritize. Other coalitions prioritize dis-
tributional objectives or, more generally, a social inclusion
agenda. This also has consequences for the members of the
coalitions, and especially for the sources of their legitimacy,
their discourse, and their power, and their ability to persuade
others to share their view of development. Only in two cases,
in Tungurahua, Ecuador, and in Quispicanchi, Peru, were
Ferna´ndez et al. (2014) able to conclude that there were trans-
formative territorial social coalitions that had actually man-
aged to combine and achieve growth and inclusion more orless simultaneously. 11 In these cases, and particularly in Tun-
gurahua, the membership of the coalition was especially broad
and as a collective actor it had come close to becoming a hege-
monic force, turning its broad and strong legitimacy into suc-
cessful political and electoral action, allowing it to win and
retain the provincial government since 2000 until today. 12
The study of these diﬀerent coalitions leads Ferna´ndez et al.
(2014) to six conclusions: (a) none of the coalitions are fully
successful in their objectives, nor are they always successful
in the same ways or in a single frame of time. A key factor is
that few coalitions are capable of sustaining themselves over
long enough periods of time because they are fragile and
depend on a particular constellation of power relations and
on the changing interests of the individual actors. (b) The ori-
gin of the coalitions is linked to changes in the perceived set of
incentives, and a signiﬁcant part of the eﬀort is directed at evi-
dencing and responding to the new context of opportunities
and constraints. To do so, coalitions resort to building alliances
and to elaborating a discourse that legitimizes them. This early
positioning is critical in shaping the capacity of the coalition to
aﬀect institutional change. (c) Changes promoted by the coali-
tions can take the form of abrupt and even radical ruptures,
provoked by internal or external shocks and forces, opening
space for deep changes in relatively short periods of time.
Changes can also happen cumulatively and gradually, without
the obvious presence of a turning point, in line with the modal-
ities suggested byMahoney and Thelen (2011). (d) Social coali-
tions help external impulses for change to take root in a
territory and to gain allies and support – in this way they bridge
the territorial and extraterritorial drivers of change and help
embed global production networks within territories. The more
successful territorial coalitions are those that have been capa-
ble of acting in diﬀerent arenas, from the territorial to national
and, in some cases, international scales. (e) The most transfor-
mational coalitions are also characterized by the presence,
reﬂective capacity, and assertiveness of social actors that have
traditionally been excluded. The greater this presence, the more
the coalition will tend to emphasize an inclusive development
agenda. That said, in some of the case studies, the social coali-
tion itself led to the strengthening of this capacity for reﬂexive
agency of the poor. (f) Finally, another important factor is the
way in which coalitions build their own legitimacy, that is, the
way in which they manage to have the coalition’s objectives
accepted as valid by other actors in the territory and elsewhere.3. CONCLUSIONS
We prioritize three empirical conclusions. First, the history
of territories has a tremendous weight in shaping development,
and in Latin America this history does not favor dynamics of
inclusive and sustainable growth. Such history manifests itself
in social structures in the territories, as well as in the deeply
embedded ideas, norms, and values that social actors take for
granted in their daily practice. This would appear to be evident,
and yet we see that the majority of rural development policies
are designed as if territories were ﬂat, lacking a past and free of
any deeply rooted constraint, as if the will of the policy maker
is all that is needed to reach the intended objectives.
The second conclusion is that territories can only be under-
stood in relation to larger systems of which they are a part
and that, as a result, progressive change never derives only from
within the territory itself. The larger economic, political, cul-
tural, and environmental trends, intensiﬁed by globalization,
reduce the autonomy of territories. Territorial societies have a
limited range of options, and it is increasingly the case that rural
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ment in general. And yet, there is much territorial diversity that
cannot be explained by geographical factors alone. Territorial
societies maintain a degree of inﬂuence over the course of their
development, and territories are not simple weather-vanes turn-
ing in whichever direction the wind blows. Our research pro-
gram allows us to conclude that existing territorial structures,
institutions, and actors, process the ideas, shocks, and incentives
that come from larger systems. This is why the same law, policy,
or economic shock, can have such diﬀerent eﬀects in diﬀerent
territories. Another corollary is that the interplay of structures,
institutions, and forms of human agency in each territory will
necessarily have a deep and often decisive inﬂuence on the loca-
tion-speciﬁc results of public policies that are wrongly assumed
to be “spatially blind” (c.f.WorldBank, 2009).We return to this
issue when we discuss our policy conclusions.
Our third empirical conclusion is that there are a signiﬁcant
number of rural territories in Latin America that have experi-
enced dynamics of inclusive and sustainable growth. Very
often these are not places with no or little poverty or inequal-
ity, nor are they record-breaking economies. They are, simply,
places that are steadily showing improvement along each of
these often contradictory dimensions of development. If these
dynamics are possible, even in countries where the larger
trends are less than bright, then we argue that they are dynam-
ics that could be politically induced elsewhere.
We now turn to some policy conclusions. First, spatially
blind sectoral policies alone will continue to fall short of rural
development needs and expectations. If sectoral policies do
not internalize spatial diﬀerences, they will inevitably have
quite diﬀerent results when they land in territories character-
ized by diﬀerent histories, institutions, structures, and cru-
cially, social actors with diﬀerent visions of what constitutes
development. This alone explains so many failures of spatially
blind rural development policies. Hence, we propose that rural
development strategies need to make far greater use of territo-
rial policies and instruments.
Territorial development policies do not replace, nor are they
“better” than sectoral policies. But without a territorial devel-
opment strategy with its corresponding policies and instru-
ments, there are at least two objectives that sectoral policies
will not be able to achieve. They will not enable each territory
to express its full development potential, and nor will they
close territorial inequalities along those dimensions of wellbe-
ing that each society has reason to value. Both objectives con-
verge on the notion of territorial cohesion that, we propose,
should be considered an important normative dimension of
development. The quality of development is diﬀerent if, for
example, the national indicators of economic growth are high
because a few places have grown a lot while the majority
stagnated, than if the national aggregates are the result of
the majority of territories doing better, but on a modest scale.
Development is fragile if it is blind to increased spatial
polarization, or if total poverty reduction is an arithmetical
artifact of people in a few places having more and better jobs
while others in many other territories are less poor in mone-
tary terms because they are receiving government cash subsi-
dies. Such examples are not literary ﬂourishes: they are all
grounded in the results of our research.
One policy question was not resolved by the Rural Territorial
Dynamics program: in countries that are developing with little
territorial cohesion, as is the case in all the 11 that we studied,
who is paying the consequences? Only those that live in the
“wrong place”, or the country as a whole? Without even deal-
ing with the ethical issues implicit in the question, Does
territorial inequality in and of itself lead to lower rates of eco-nomic growth or of aggregate poverty reduction? There are the-
oretical and empirical elements to suggest that this could well
be the case (Bru¨lhart & Sbergami, 2009; Cerina & Mureddu,
2011; Williamson,1965), particularly in middle-income coun-
tries, but the answer to this question is still pending.
Based on the results of the Rural Territorial Dynamics pro-
gram, what should be the core elements of territorial develop-
ment strategies and of the policies through which such a
strategy might be implemented? First, policies should seek to
achieve institutional change at the territorial level in each of
the ﬁve domains that we have identiﬁed as critical for the
emergence of dynamics of growth with social inclusion and
environmental sustainability. There is already much accumu-
lated knowledge and policy experience in promoting more
inclusive institutions in each of these bundles of factors.
Secondly, territorial development strategies need to invest a
great deal in strengthening the capacities of territorially based
social actors, including their capacity to see and do things dif-
ferently. This is a particularly challenging objective, if for no
other reason than it requires as a sine qua non condition, that
centrally located actors, particularly those in positions of
power in national governments, transfer decision-making
power to territorial societies.
There are neither magic bullets nor short and direct routes to
territorial development. Localized virtuous cycles of socially
inclusive and environmentally sustainable growth, will be a
unique creation in each territory, as each place is unique in
its history, its circumstances, its capacities and its constraints.
There is no other way but for each territory to do its own devel-
opment within the range of options made possible by national
conditions. If we had to summarize our answer to the question
of what is a “successful territory”, we would say that it is one
whose actors gradually acquire the capacity to act upon small
ﬁssures in the status quo, to widen them according to their own
understanding of what development is about and to eﬀect mea-
surable (if not enormous) advances in growth, poverty,
inequality, and environmental integrity. If this is so, then rural
development policies should above all involve creating space,
time, and opportunity for actors in the territories to do their
own job. This means policies that recognize that territorial
actors must have decision-making authority over their develop-
ment strategies and initiatives, and that make available the
investments, supports, and incentives to strengthen
the capacities of territorial actors, including their capacity
to think/act in a coordinated or collaborative manner. 13
How then does a policy construct agency at the territorial
level? The results from a previous Rimisp research program
on social movements and territorial development
(Abramovay, Magalha˜es, & Schro¨der, 2008; Bebbington,
Abramovay, & Chiriboga, 2008; Bebbington, Dani, de Haan,
& Walton, 2008; Vera, Coelho, & Favareto, 2008; Ospina
Peralta, Santillana Ortiz, & Arboleda, 2008) conﬁrm that social
engineering eﬀorts to build agency, usually end up creating
bureaucratic organizations empty of vitality and capacity to
innovate, or in new forms of corporativism which regardless
of their progressive narratives still end up being clientelistic
(Ospina Peralta et al., 2008). The analysis of the development
of the few cases of territorial coalitions that have actually led
their territories in a direction toward more socially inclusive
and environmentally sustainable growth, suggests that the
emphasis should be on widening political opportunities and on
creating incentives so that actors in territories interact and
develop their collective action according to the forms, rhythms,
and objectives of their own choosing. This is a diﬀerent strategy
than that used by policies that de facto seek to have a deﬁning
inﬂuence on who participates, how they participate, the
136 WORLD DEVELOPMENTmilestones and deadlines of participation, and the goals and
purposes of the whole eﬀort. Territorial development means
valuing the development of autonomous social actors (c.f.
Escobar, 2008).
This of course has a number of substantive implications for
international and national development policy decision-mak-
ers. One is about who has the authority to decide what.
Another is about the time frames of development. A third
has to do with the role of the State as guarantor of transparent
and non-discretionary institutions so that actors with greater
power in the territory cannot surpass certain boundaries with
impunity, and thus have a greater incentive to value certain
basic agreements about the nature of the civic game.
It is evident that in societies that are deeply unequal in the
ﬁrst place, developing the capacity for agency of social actors
demands a very important component of positive discrimina-
tion favoring those with less power, the poor, and the socially
excluded. If this is not part of the strategy, then territorial coali-
tions in all likelihood will not include these sectors of society,
nor will their agendas respond to their interests and priorities.The third priority is to reduce territorial development gaps,
not through expansion of the capacities of territorial societies
as has been discussed above, but by means of targeted national
policies. The program that we have presented in this special
issue has documented very large spatial gaps in dozens of devel-
opment indicators. In several countries we have found a pro-
cess of increasing spatial polarization rather than one of
convergence. This suggests two themes that require attention.
The ﬁrst is to design policy instruments that have the explicit
objective of closing speciﬁc development gaps (e.g., in educa-
tion, infrastructure, local government capacity, and so on)
through targeted investment in lagging territories. The second
is more complex, and it has to do with removing the blinds
from sectoral policies that until now treat all territories as iden-
tical. The spatially diﬀerentiated results, outcomes, and
impacts of spatially blind policies must be made evident, and
policy design processes should recognize these diﬀerences in
order to include ways to avoid, mitigate, or at least compensate
spatially diﬀerentiated policy results, outcomes, and impacts.NOTES1. In fact, 20 case studies were started, but the ﬁnal report of one of them
was not accepted during the program’s quality control process, and thus
we never considered this case study in our analyses.
2. An ongoing but yet unﬁnished study in Chile, Peru, and Mexico,
apparently will conﬁrm that several of these territories have indeed been in
this condition of economic and social stagnation, or worse, for several
decades, a longer span of time than the one we looked at in the RTD
program.
3. We should, however, warn the reader that our research strategy based
on a sizable and yet limited number of case studies, implies that our results
and interpretation should strictly speaking be considered a hypothesis that
needs to be tested with additional and independent work.
4. Here it is important to highlight, as we have done in the introductory
article in this special issue, that our analytical and policy concern is not
growth, or social inclusion, or environmental sustainability, but dynamics
in which there is simultaneous progress in the three objectives.
5. In each case resulting from highly idiosyncratic historic events, such as
a particular alliance in what is today Jauja between the Spanish
conquerors and the local inhabitants, to defeat the then dominant power
of the Inca empire; such alliance was rewarded with being exempted from
“extractive institutions” (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012) of the rules
imposed by the new colonial power.
6. On the other hand, it is possible that these same economic mechanisms
lead to greater inequality between the people in the urban core and those
in the surrounding rural area within the same territory. The study by
Berdegue´ et al. (2015) conﬁrms that this is a possible and, above certain
city-size, a probable outcome.
7. For example, in Nicaragua, one of the least urbanized countries in
our study, the deep rural municipalities have, in total, four times lesspoor persons than rurban municipalities with less than 100,000
inhabitants.
8. Although our results indicate that this eﬀect is stronger with relatively
less educated young persons, and also with young men is more eﬀective
than with young women.
9. A regionally important city of about 400,000 inhabitants during the
period covered by the case study.
10. We need to be particularly careful in this part of our analysis, as in
the 19 case studies we had a small minority that approached the conditions
that we will discuss in this section of the article. This is not strange: if we
found that only in a small minority of the 10 thousand territories we found
WWW-W conditions, we could not expect to ﬁnd a large proportion of
success stories in the case studies, even if we selected them purposefully to
be illustrative of the most promising dynamics.
11. Although in the Peruvian territory, poverty levels continued to be
very high and growth processes were still timid. The coalition in this
territory had been in place for only a few years, while the one in Ecuador
had a history of decades and roots that went ever further back in time.
12. In the latest provincial elections, in February 2014, the political
forces representing this coalition, obtained over 50% of the popular vote,
well ahead of the competing political alternatives. By the end of the
period, the coalition will have governed Tungurahua for two decades.
13. In another initiative that followed on the footsteps of the Rural
Territorial Dynamics program, many of the same partners are actively
engaged in designing and supporting large-scale territorial development
policies and programs that are based on this idea. This is taking place in
Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru, and the implementation of at least
some of these new policies and programs should start in 2015.REFERENCESAbramovay, R., Magalha˜es, R., & Schro¨der, M. (2008). Social movements
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